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The high demand for more intense neutrino beams is closely related to an increase of the 
production of radioactive isotopes in target caverns, decay tunnels and hadron stop areas. This 
paper gives a (short) summary of radiation protection lessons learned from the past CERN 
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Accelerator driven neutrino beam operation has always been a big challenge not only for 
the reliability of components but also for radiation protection issues. The demands for higher 
beam power and intensity but also a tightening of annual dose limits are difficult to combine. 
However, careful design of high power neutrino facilities together with thoroughly optimizing 
of maintenance or repair work have shown significant improvements of existing neutrino 
facilities compared to past ones. This paper gives a (short) overview of problems which existed 
at a previous neutrino facility at CERN, describes the changes which have been adapted for the 
new facility and finally reports on lessons learned from existing installations at CERN and 
Fermilab. 
2. Neutrino studies at CERN 
Operation of high intensive proton beams in order to produce neutrinos has a long history 
at CERN. Neutrino physics started at CERN in 1963 using particles from the Proton 
Synchrotron (PS). This PS neutrino program continued until 1977 and the highlight was the 
discovery of the weak neutral current in 1973. A new neutrino program was proposed in 1971 
during the planning of the Super-Proton-Synchrotron (SPS) project. It was decided to build a 
new facility in the west area of CERN, the West Area Neutrino Facility WANF. This facility 
was used until the area was shut down in 2000. The beam line was operated at proton intensities 
of up to 3×1013 protons per pulse (450 GeV). In order to continue neutrino physics at CERN, the 
CNGS facility (CERN Neutrinos to Gran Sasso) was proposed. CNGS was approved in 1999 
and started beam operation in 2006 (up to 4.8×1013 protons per pulse, 400 GeV).  
3. WANF vs. CNGS – improvements from a radiological point of view. 
Although the beam intensities and energies used at both facilities were similar, three major 
differences between the WANF and CNGS facilities exist from the civil engineering point of 
view. All three changes significantly improved the radiological conditions for personnel but also 
for the environment. Whereas only little or no shielding (except around the target itself) was 
present at WANF, the whole CNGS secondary beam line from the target station down to the 
beginning of the decay tunnel is embedded in massive shielding (Figure 1 a-b). Particular 
emphasis was put into the choice of shielding material. Marble shielding blocks have been 
placed outside the iron target shielding and also around the horn. Induced activity in marble is 
known to be considerable lower than that in concrete. The CNGS shielding around the beam 
line components fulfils mainly three purposes. First it considerable reduces dose rates during 
maintenance or repair work inside the cavern, it reduces also the activation of air as the 
pathways of secondary particles are significantly shortened and also lowers the activation of the 
concrete tunnel walls. The last one is of special importance for de-commissioning of the facility 
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Figures 1 a-b: WANF (left) CNGS (right). 
The second major improvement was the provision of a service side-gallery which gives 
access to the target chamber without exposing people to the most radioactive items in the 
chamber. This allows necessary equipment like pumps, cooling units, power supplies or cable 
trays to be installed in areas with much lower dose rates and activation and therefore 
significantly reduced radiation exposure during maintenance of these equipments. In addition, 
people making repairs on beam line components themselves can prepare the work in the service 
gallery and therefore minimizing the amount of time spent in the highest radiation environment. 
However, a future facility should not have straight connecting tunnels between the target cavern 
and the side-gallery but rather use a ‘three-leg’ design in order to reduce radiation streaming 
into the side-gallery. 
The third improvement from the civil engineering viewpoint was the provision of a simple 
stub-tunnel as a storage area for radioactive items close to the target chamber. Consequently 
there is no need for long (time and distance) transport of highly radioactive components to a 
storage location somewhere on the surface. 
Past experience from the WANF has early shown that significant dose will be received by 
personnel during exchange and transport of highly activated components like targets or horns. 
Therefore, remote handling of shielding blocks and remote exchange of faulty components is 
possible at CNGS. This even includes remote transport of an item into the storage area 
mentioned above. Cameras are installed onto the crane during such an intervention. The crane 
can be operated from a low radiation area upstream of the target cavern. 
In addition, induced activity is monitored at CNGS by ten (fix installed) induced activity 
monitors (IAM). In order to allow a remotely controlled radiation measurement, a survey 
platform has been developed at CERN. This platform can be mounted onto the crane (equipped 
with cameras) and allows one to measure residual dose rates at nearly any location in the target 
chamber. Data from the detector are transmitted via a wireless connection to a laptop 
temporarily installed in a low radiation area upstream of the target cavern. Consequently, 
manual radiation surveys are rarely required and exposure of personnel during the survey to 
high radiation levels is therefore prevented.  
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4. Lessons learned from CNGS, NuMI, MiniBooNE and K2K 
Beam-induced ionization of air and therefore the production of aggressive radicals is still a 
major issue in existing target stations of neutrino beam facilities. These radicals create a nitric 
acid environment where corrosion poses a severe problem. Several examples underline this 
problem. MiniBooNE observed a reduction in neutrino flux which was traced back to failure of 
a steel chain supposed to hold a moveable absorber (heavy steel plates) out of the beamline. 
This problem was solved by using softer steel chains which are not subject to hydrogen 
embrittlement. NuMI has decided to fill Helium inside their decay pipe because they observed 
weakening of the decay pipe window (Aluminium 1/16 inch thick) due to corrosion. Especially 
for ‘humid’ environments like water cooled targets or horns failures are mostly related to 
corrosion and radiation damage. Effective air dehumidifiers are therefore essential. The T2K 
collaboration in Japan has even decided to house its target and horn completely inside a Helium 
environment. 
The use of redundancy for delicate components like targets or water circuits for the 
cooling of horn/reflector or targets can increase the lifetime of components considerable. CNGS 
has installed a target magazine which contains 5 targets. In case of a failure of one target the 
magazine can be rotated remotely and bringing a new target into the beam line (Figure 2a). In 
case of a leak in the cooling circuit of the CNGS horn/reflector the circuit can easily be 
switched to the second circuit by moving a handle bar into the ‘second’ position (Figure 2b). 
 
   
Figure 2 a-b: CNGS target magazine (left), switch of horn water cooling circuits (right). 
 
Further, the correct choice of materials used inside high radiation areas is very important. 
For example, stainless steel should have no or very low content of cobalt. Experiences have 
shown that the dose rates (after longer cooling times) of irradiated stainless steel objects 
strongly depend on the amount of cobalt in the material. Similar conclusions can be made for 
concrete which should have a low content of sodium. Preferable would be to use marble 
shielding blocks instead of concrete. Although it is more expensive, the dose rate is significantly 
lower than that of activated concrete blocks.  
Some general remarks can be given in case of necessary repair or exchange of faulty 
items. The exchange of highly activated objects should only be done remotely. Thus, the 
installation of a remote handling facility (simplest would be a crane) should be already planned 
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during the design phase. Further, spare parts of sensitive equipment should be available. Repair 
of broken items can cause high doses to the repair team. Performing dry runs on (not activated) 
spare parts or mock-up models significantly improves a work procedure and therefore reduces 
the received doses. Work on highly activated objects should be performed in a shielded work 
cell. Future facilities in the MW power range will heavily rely on remote handling and the 
possibility to perform repair work in a well-shielded work cell which should be even equipped 
with a remotely controlled robotic arm. 
Another lesson learned from existing high power target stations for neutrino production is 
the amount of tritium which was found in infiltration water close to the target cavern. At NuMI 
tritium content in water pumped out from the underground tunnels showed higher levels than 
expected. Two major modifications have been implemented: a) the condensate from an air 
conditioning unit in the target area was collected and disposed separately and b) two 
dehumidification systems were installed, one for target hall and one for target chase air. These 
prevent tritiated humidity from passing through the decay hall and mixing with the tunnel water. 
Finally, these measures reduced the amount of tritium by about a factor of seven that otherwise 
could reach the Fermilab surface waters. In addition, Fermilab started an investigation together 
with help from the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) to understand the tritium 
origin and transport [2]. Similar tritium issues were later also observed at CNGS. 
5. Conclusions 
Operation of high power target station of neutrino facilities poses a big challenge to keep 
dose rates minimal to which maintenance personnel could be exposed. Also induced activities in 
the structure of these facilities and its surroundings but also the magnitude of any release to the 
environment via air or water release have always to be as low as reasonably achievable. 
Existing facilities have shown that this is feasible providing careful design and optimized repair 
and maintenance procedures. 
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